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Abstract 
 
The paper discusses 21 days of political leadership in the UK following the EU 
referendum, the publication of the Chilcot Report on the Iraq War, and the 
appointment of a new cabinet by the new Prime Minister, Theresa May. It begins 
by modelling four possible approaches to political decision-making by taking 
into account the intent of the decision-maker, their acceptance or avoidance of 
responsibility, and the nature of the consequences. It suggests ‘Dirty Hands’ 
exists when the decision-maker recognizes the deleterious consequences of what 
they deem to be necessary action – and intends to engender these - but takes 
responsibility. Clean Heels embodies a decision where the decision-maker 
recognizes the consequences might be deleterious, and intends them to be so, 
but avoids all responsibility. Mea Culpa describes a decision-maker who did not 
intend deleterious consequences but having seen them occur takes 
responsibility. Finally, the Spectator is someone who has no intention of making 
any difference to anything and thus takes no responsibility, but often plays a 
destructively critical role from the sidelines. This heuristic – and it is no more 
than a heuristic – is then illustrated by considering the actions of four decision-
makers during this period: Boris Johnson, Tony Blair, Nigel Farage and Theresa 
May. 
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Introduction 
 
From the date of the result of the European Referendum in the UK (24 June 
2016) through the date of publication for the Chilcot Report on the Iraq War (6 
July 2016) (an official report into the Iraq War) and onto the date when Theresa 
May, the new British Prime Minister, announced her new cabinet (14 July 2016), 
the UK witnessed three weeks of unprecedented political turmoil. In the next 
section I want to consider how a decision-making heuristic might help us 
navigate our way through the 21 days that transfixed the UK in 2016. First the 
events themselves will be sketched before an analysis is attempted. 
On 24 June, following the Referendum to stay or exit the European Union 
the previous day, the result – 52 per cent in favour of exiting (the Brexit option) 
and 48 per cent in favour of remaining – triggered a political crisis. First, the then 
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Prime Minister, David Cameron, resigned (an archetypal Clean Heels response to 
a problem). Then a consequent competition for his replacement saw the exit first 
of Boris Johnson, then Michael Gove (the two leading Brexit campaigners) 
quickly followed by the other contenders for Number 10 Downing Street (the 
official residence of the British Prime Minister), leaving Theresa May as the 
incumbent with a new Conservative Cabinet that included some Brexit leaders 
back in the fold and some Remainers out, George Osborne, the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, in particular. The result also triggered the resignation of Nigel Farage 
from leadership of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) and a 
challenge to the leader of the Labour Party, Jeremy Corbyn, from inside his own 
Parliamentary party. Amidst all this, on 6 July, the Chilcot Report on the Iraq War 
was finally published after seven years of sitting, condemning, among other 
things, the poor post war planning and the dubious decision-making of the then 
Prime Minister Tony Blair. 
May’s new cabinet included several prominent Brexiteers, notably Boris 
Johnson as Foreign Secretary (the man who insulted more foreign dignitaries 
that anyone else including questioning the role of Barak Obama’s ‘part-Kenyan 
ancestry’ and the predilection of the Turkish president for sex with goats), David 
Davis as the individual responsible for negotiating Brexit (who is suing the Prime 
Minister for her role in restricting human rights as the then Foreign Secretary in 
the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act (DRIPA)), and Andrea Leadsom 
as Environment Secretary (who recently suggested at a Brexit campaign meeting 
that ‘It would make so much more sense if those with the big fields do the sheep, 
and those with the hill farms do the butterflies’ (quoted Bourke, 2016)). Perhaps 
the only real surprise is that Gove was not appointed Minister for Health having 
campaigned – as did all the Brexiteers – against a campaign bus painted with the 
logo suggesting that leaving the EU would enable £350 million a week to be 
returned to the NHS; a claim which turned out to be a total fabrication. But, and 
this is an important point to note about political campaigns in general: they are 
not won by statistical analysis of economic trends, threats or opportunities – it 
isn’t ‘the economy, stupid’; ‘it’s the narrative, smart arse’. The story of ‘getting 
our country back’ is one that resonates on both sides of the Atlantic with 
Trump’s campaign combining fear of ‘the other’ with a strategy that contains 
nothing except himself. As Clay Shirky tweeted on 22 July during the Democratic 
Convention ‘We've brought fact-checkers to a culture war. Time to get serious.’ i  
Politics is often regarded as the land of Dirty Hands – the place where 
morality is displaced by the political necessities of life; where the greater good of 
the community requires political leaders to take responsibility for the 
undertaking of rather unsavoury acts on our behalf. But we have also witnessed 
a different phenomenon: Clean Heels – here political leaders take the opposite 
tack: they avoid responsibility for the confusion generated by their actions 
undertaken for what many take to be selfish reasons.  
Dirty Hands is a relatively well understood concept in political leadership 
but Clean Heels is less so. This article is aimed at fleshing out the latter against 
the existing skeleton of the former and two other options available: the Spectator 
– who merely watches from the side-lines and plays no direct part in the action, 
and Mea Culpa (through my fault) – where the decision maker does not intend to 
have the effects that occurred but takes responsibility for the consequences. In 
what follows I consider the nature of each concept and seek to illustrate them 
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with regard to the actions of various political leaders in the UK over the 21-day 
period.  
 
 
 
 
Modelling the political landscape 
 
To help navigate this political landscape I wanted to work with three related 
concepts: whether the individual intended the effects of their action (or 
inaction), whether they accept or deny responsibility, and whether they are 
aware of the consequences of their original decision. The heuristic below 
captures the theoretical differences between these approaches and all of these 
attributes can have high or low significance. Of course, as with all heuristics, the 
complexities are discarded for the sake of conceptual clarity (for example, actors 
may wander across the model in reality) but in analysing any real case the 
complexities and contradictions need to be added back in.  
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Dirty Hands 
 
The original phrase ‘Dirty Hands’ comes from the eponymous play by Jean Paul 
Sartre (1955) set in a fictional civil war in which Hoederer, secretary of the 
Communist Party, is trying to persuade Hugo, a young idealist, that to secure 
political power requires abandoning some ethical principles for the sake of the 
greater good:  
 
How you cling to your purity, young man! How afraid you are to soil your 
hands! All right, stay pure! What good will it do? Why did you join us? 
Purity is an idea for a yogi or a monk. You intellectuals and bourgeois 
anarchists use it as a pretext for doing nothing. To do nothing, to remain 
motionless, arms at your sides, wearing kid gloves. Well, I have dirty hands. 
right up to the elbows. I’ve plunged them in filth and blood. What do you 
hope? Do you think you can govern innocently? 
 
This, of course, reflects Machiavelli’s concern that the Prince sometimes needed 
to act immorally in an immoral world for the greater good. 
 
The fact is that a man who wants to act virtuously in every way necessarily 
comes to grief among so many who are not virtuous. Therefore if a prince 
wants to maintain his rule he must learn how not to be virtuous, and to 
make use of this or not according to need (1975:91). 
 
Walzer (1973, 1977) subsequently adopted the term and, in the latter 
publication, argued that in what he termed a ‘supreme emergency’ (what Schmitt 
(1922/2006: 5) called a ‘state of exception’) could justify ostensibly immoral 
acts. For example, the area-bombing campaign in Germany by the Allied air 
forces in the first part of the Second World War killed thousands of civilians but 
against a backdrop where the existence of the UK was in grave doubt and the 
1,000 year Reich did not seem a delusional fantasy, this was regarded as 
legitimate by the decision-makers (Harris and Churchill).  
This catastrophist justification for Dirty Hands is radically different from 
Machiavelli’s argument that the Prince must do whatever is necessary for the 
sake of the community (but not just for the sake of the Prince). Both cases, 
however, still rely upon the leader making a judgement about the nature of the 
emergency (for Walzer) and the nature of the public good (for Machiavelli). We 
also know from the work of Mitchell (2004) that political and military leaders 
are perfectly capable of justifying the mass murder of civilians not because they 
pose a catastrophic threat to the community but because they hold the ‘wrong’ 
ideology.  
Perhaps a more difficult case is that which Lincoln faced with trying to 
abolish slavery during the American Civil War but without the necessary 
majority in the House to support this. Ultimately, as Goodwin (2009) documents, 
Lincoln engaged in some dubious political methods to cajole, bribe and threaten 
members of the House to change sides and slavery was duly abolished – but only 
at the cost of rather distasteful – but necessary as far as Lincoln was concerned - 
political manoeuvring. This captures one of the significant elements of Dirty 
Hands decisions: they are often wrong/wrong dilemmas, so the issue is how to 
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choose the least damaging option (see Sanders, 2015; Watters, 2016) and they 
fall within what Primo Levi considered a grey zone, beyond conventional ethics 
where the Utilitarian evaluates the consequences and the Deontologist assesses 
the overriding duty. In Dirty Hands scenarios it is not possible to evaluate the 
consequences nor does adhering to a categorical ethic resolve the dilemma. As 
Levi (1989: 39-43) describes the entry of the newcomer to the extermination 
camp: 
 
The newcomer was derided, [probably] the hostility was motivated, like all 
other forms of intolerance, in an unconscious attempt to consolidate the 
‘we’ at the expense of the ‘they’... As for the privileged prisoners, the 
situation was more complex... They represented a potent minority within 
the Lager but a potent majority among survivors.... [to cope with] the hard 
labour, beatings, the cold, and the illnesses the meagre food ration was 
insufficient... Death by hunger, or by diseases induced by hunger, was the 
prisoner’s normal destiny, avoidable only with additional food... Obtaining 
that required whatever it took to lift oneself above the norm.... The ascent 
of the privileged... is an anguishing but unfailing phenomena.... It is a grey 
zone, poorly defined, where the two camps of masters and servants both 
diverge and converge. This grey zone possesses an incredibly complicated 
internal structure and contains within itself enough to confuse our need to 
judge.... The harsher the oppression the greater the more widespread 
among the oppressed is the willingness... to collaborate.  
 
For some political philosophers the legitimation of unethical practices is 
anything but a grey zone. As Coady (2008) reminds us, for Thomas Hobbes 
ethical prohibitions against certain practices could not hold when compliance 
with the ethics led to self-destruction because it was ‘contrary to the ground of 
all laws of nature’ (1982: 110); an interesting reflection on the dilemma faced by 
liberals seeking to protect freedom of speech even for those seeking the end of 
freedom of speech, or the democratic rights of those who seek to secure 
democratic election in order to destroy democracy (as of course Hitler did in 
1933). 
 Hobbes was writing against the particular backdrop of the English Civil 
Wars, and war in general is a classic arena to consider the nature not just of Dirty 
Hands but of ‘blood-spattered hands’ (Rubenstein, 2015) in which – in this case – 
NGOs, though not guilty of any over wrong-doing themselves, are coerced into 
supporting unethical practices for the sake of the greater community.  
 
Mea Culpa 
 
Dirty Hands differs from Mea Culpa in that the former involves a decision that 
the decision-maker knows will involve ethical transgressions – but it’s 
legitimated on the basis of the greater good (however defined) - whereas Mea 
Culpa (in this context) is an admission of responsibility after the event which was 
taken in good faith but had unforeseen consequences. So someone with Dirty 
Hands knows what will happen – but still acts – while an actor who admits Mea 
Culpa does not know what will happen. In effect, Mea Culpa is responsible 
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because of consequentialist logic whereas someone with Dirty Hands is 
responsible because of a deontological transgression and the consequences. 
 The Latin origins of the phrase derive from the Roman Catholic Mass, or 
more strictly, the Confiteor in which ‘Mea Culpa’ is repeated three times. Its first 
use in English seems to be in Chaucer’s Troilus and Criseyde but the important 
point is its link to the confession of sins and the acceptance of repentance. This, 
of course, also explains its popularity with various regimes in communist 
societies, most notably the Khmer Rouge (Ngor, 2003) and Maoist China (Kraus, 
2012), whose penchant for self-reproach and collective admission of failure 
ended up in the Cambodian Killing Fields and the ‘re-education’ of intellectuals in 
China. However, these variants are usually locked into the authoritarian desires 
of the state, rather than the guilt-accepting desires of the individual. 
Perhaps one of the most well known Mea Culpa messages of the latter 
variant was never transmitted: it was Eisenhower’s press release if the D-Day 
landings had failed: 
 
Our landings in the Cherbourg-Havre area have failed to gain a 
satisfactory foothold and I have withdrawn the troops. My decision to 
attack at this time and place was based on the best information 
available. The troops, the air, and the Navy did all that bravery and 
devotion to duty could do. If any blame or fault attaches to the attempt it 
is mine alone (quoted in Grint, 2008: 57). 
 
At the other end of the significance scale is the sign in the American furniture 
store – Pottery Barn – which reads ‘You break it you own it.’ (Bush and Lewis, 
2016) which shifts the act from one of intended Clean Heels (nobody saw that 
just ignore it) to an enforced Mea Culpa (we saw you on store CCTV…). 
Interestingly, Eisenhower also shifted from Clean Heels to a voluntary Mea Culpa 
in the above D-Day quote when he replaced ‘The troops have been withdrawn’ 
with ‘I have withdrawn the troops’; the shift from passive to active moves the 
responsibility too (Tavris and Aronson, 2007: 236).  
               Naturally some Mea Culpas are better than others: Margaret Beckett, 
then a Labour MP who voted in favour of the Iraq War, said that she ‘would take 
responsibility for her actions as long as Isis took responsibility for its’. Which 
really misses the point: Isis glorifies their responsibilities for atrocities rather 
than try to avoid them. Meredith McIver’s admission of guilt for the plagiarism of 
Michelle Obama’s 2008 speech used by Melania Trump at the Republican 
convention in July 2016 is a much clearer example of Mea Culpa, though Donald 
Trump is renowned as someone who rarely admits mistakes (Diamond, 2016). 
 
Clean Heels 
 
If the land (or should it be Primo Levi’s metaphorical swamp?) of Dirty Hands is 
neither clean nor clear, what about the land of Clean Heels? There is self-
evidently less land or swamp to navigate here because it appears to be a less 
obvious political phenomenon. I take Clean Heels to represent the action taken 
by someone who, having facilitated a decision for, or change of direction by, the 
community then washes her or his hands of the decision and (sometimes 
literally) runs away denying any responsibility. So if Dirty Hands is an admission 
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of responsibility for the act and an acceptance of the necessarily deleterious 
consequences for the community, Clean Heels is a denial of responsibility for the 
act and of any problematic consequences. Sartre (1993) calls this ‘Bad Faith’  - 
mauvaise foi - when someone either denies responsibility or claims they had no 
choice in a situation where there is always a choice, as long as the consequences 
of the choice are accepted. In effect, and this for Sartre is the tragedy of 
humanity: we are not as Rousseau claimed, ‘born to be free’ but ‘condemned to 
be free’. 
Perhaps one of the clearest examples of Clean Heels occurred towards the 
end of the First World War when the German Kaiser and General Ludendorff, 
having presided over a disastrous war, ceded power to a cross-party government 
that failed to negotiate an armistice. So, peace was finally obtained by a 
replacement Social Democratic party, led by Ebert, and thus it became a simple 
process for the political right, having brought Germany to military catastrophe 
and the brink of revolution, to subsequently claim that it was the political left 
that ‘stabbed the country in the back’ and negotiated a humiliating peace treaty. 
Of course, Clean Heels is not restricted to the actions of political leaders 
and we all spend considerable effort denying responsibility for actions that do 
not work out as we intended or indeed do achieve what we intend but we do not 
wish to be seen to be responsible. As we have known from the early work of 
Festinger (1957) on Cognitive Dissonance, the ability to rationalize our way out 
of responsibility is a skill that we all deploy in our self-defence. Or, as Gilbert 
suggests (2006) in his rumination on the movie Casablanca, had Ingrid Bergman 
stayed with Humphrey Bogart or gone with her husband is really irrelevant, she, 
like the rest of us, would have been able to rationalize both choices and lived 
happily ever after.  
This is self-evidently not always the case: in 2008 Elisabeth Fritzl escaped 
after 24 years of imprisonment by her father, Josef, in a concealed cellar room in 
Amstetten, Austria, where he repeatedly raped her and fathered seven children 
by her. At the trial Josef Fritz rationalized his behaviour thus: 
 
Ever since she entered puberty she did not adhere to any rules any 
more, she would spend whole nights in dingy bars, drinking alcohol and 
smoking. I only tried to pull her out of that misery. I got her a job as a 
waitress but she would not go to work for days. She even escaped twice 
and hung out with bad people during this time and they were not a good 
company for her. I would bring her back home each time, but she would 
try to escape again. That is why I had to do something; I had to create a 
place where I could keep Elisabeth, by force if necessary, away from the 
outside world. ii  
 
David Frum, President Bush’s speech-writer, played the opposite tactic: 
‘US-UK intervention offered Iraq a better future. Whatever [the] West’s mistakes: 
sectarian war was a choice Iraqis made for themselves. There [was] no US-UK 
intervention in Syria, and it collapsed into sectarian war even more horrible that 
Iraq’s’ (quoted by Roberts and Jacobs, 2016). Note here how responsibility for 
the Iraq anarchy is displaced back onto the Iraqis – as if the US-UK intervention 
played no role in it, while the Syrian case is denied because the Iraqi 
disintegration apparently played no part in the Syrian disintegration. 
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But while rationalizing our decisions is often a means of protecting 
ourselves from a decision that only affects us, Clean Heels represents an action 
that puts the community at risk, is irresponsibly undertaken, and includes an 
escape route for the decision-maker. The final approach requires no escape route 
because there is never any real intention to act. 
 
Spectator 
 
Spectators come in two varieties: the first is a passive variant where you just 
watch what is going on and play no part in it, nor voice any opinion about it; the 
second is more active, but only as an armchair critic, articulating to anyone 
interested what you would have done, if you were in charge (or if you could be 
bothered to engage with the world in some meaningful way – an approach that 
Pericles castigates in his funeral oration: ‘We do not say that a man who takes no 
interest in politics is a man who minds his own business; we say that he has no 
business here at all.’ (Thucydides, 1954:74)). To those who do participate in 
politics then the Spectator is often perceived as a utopian - the equivalent of one 
who thinks that the political good does not require dirty hands – that omelettes 
can be made without breaking any eggs. Indeed, according to the Oxford English 
Dictionary the first known account of the phrase, ‘you cannot make an omelette 
with breaking eggs’ was delivered in French by the Royalist General François de 
Charette who was leader of the counter-revolution in the Vendée and was 
captured in March, 1796. On being questioned about his role in the deaths of 
Republicans he allegedly said: ‘On ne saurait faire d'omelette sans casser des 
œufs.’ He was subsequently shot. 
This, of course, is one of the main defences for Dirty Hands, and thus a 
useful reversal would lead us to those who prefer not to make an omelette in the 
first place: hence Eggless Omelettes – a utopian dish involving no real 
ingredients and requiring no action or sacrifice. This would be significantly 
different from someone whose decision had unintended consequences for the 
community and therefore, from a Kantian/Deontological perspective would be 
able to deny responsibility because there never was any intent. Indeed, this is the 
land of self-chosen impotence, where the armchair critic pontificates on what 
should be done without actually doing anything about it. This has clear 
resonances with the internal machinations of the Labour Party at the time of 
writing as it struggled to define itself as a party of the Left or a party of the 
Centre-Left, as a party interested in securing power and making the 
compromises necessary for that acquisition, or a party keener on maintaining 
political purity ahead of pragmatic power. As Jon Lansman (Chair of Momentum 
– the successor to the Labour Party organization that campaigned successfully 
for Jeremy Corbyn to be elected leader) - tweeted on 16 July 2016. ‘Democracy 
gives power to people, “Winning” is the small bit that matters to political elites 
who want to keep power themselves.’ This is what Nick Cohen (2016) called 
‘Empty Leftism’ or an assumption that an omelette did not require the breaking 
of eggs.  
It also resonates with a political problem facing Cromwell during the 
English Civil War when many of the military commanders on the Parliamentary 
side secured their positions simply because of their nobility, and many of these 
were reluctant to engage in the military violence that Cromwell deemed 
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necessary to bring the king to heel. As a result, during the Long Parliament in 
1645 a ‘Self-Denying Ordnance’ demanded that members of Parliament must 
resign their military positions. This effectively weeded out the less militant 
military leaders on the Parliamentary side and led to the beginnings of the New 
Model Army that eventually crushed the Royalists. 
  Finally, I should also note that academics like myself often end up in the 
arena as professional critics, not as those engaged in trying to do something 
about the world: hence, as Marx would have said: the point is not just to 
understand the world but to change it. It is not without some truth that the term 
‘just academic’ is used for an impotent and pointless suggestion. However, 
eggless omelettes might also cover those who are proved correct – but too late. 
Or, as the Russian Embassy tweeted on the day the Chilcot Report was published, 
‘Keep Calm but I Told You So: No real WMD in Bagdhad, unjust and highly 
dangerous war. The entire region on the receiving end.’ (Quoted Guardian, 
7/7/16: 6) 
In the next section I take four political actors to illustrate some of these 
frames over the 21 days. 
 
Boris Johnson: Attempted Clean Heels   
 
Johnson’s rise, fall and return from the dead are no more than we should expect. 
From his days in Oxford University as President of the Students’ Union he has 
made little secret of his political ambitions to lead the UK via his incumbency as 
Mayor of London. Alexander Boris de Pfeffel Johnson, to give him his full name, 
was MP for Henley between 2001 and 2008 when he was elected Mayor of 
London, a position he was re-elected to in 2012 to serve a second four year term. 
In 2015 he became MP for Uxbridge and South Ruislip, and not until February 
2016 – as the referendum campaign got underway, did he suddenly appear as a 
lead campaigner for Brexit. Indeed, in the week running up to his decision he 
consistently refused to announce which side he would support, claiming that he 
needed to think about it and only decided ‘after a huge amount of heartache’ and 
an ‘agonisingly difficult’ decision (quoted Guardian, 21/2/16: 1). Michael 
Heseltine, his predecessor as MP for Henley responded, ‘Given that Boris has 
spent so long agonising over this decision, his decision is illogical. If it takes you 
this long to make up your mind about something so fundamental and you still 
have questions, then surely the right option is to stay with what you know rather 
than risk our economy and security with a leap in the dark’ (quoted Guardian, 
21/2/16:1). The following day Johnson even floated the idea of a second 
referendum to confirm the result of the first, an idea rejected by Cameron, but 
one that suggested Johnson was not a categorical Brexiter. Yet as the campaign 
progressed his position hardened to the point where some in the Conservative 
Party suggested it was all a ‘fledgling leadership campaign feeding off the nasty 
handiwork of Nigel Farage’ (quoted Guardian 27/2/16). 
 One of the most influential slogan’s of the Brexit campaign was first 
uttered by Johnson on June 20 when he demanded that the country should ‘take 
back control’, a slogan that shifted the debate from the economic to the political 
sphere and began the slow build up for Brexit. In fact, ‘Vote Leave, Let’s Take 
Back Control’ became a key slogan after a meeting in August 2015 in 
Westminster Tower when Dominic Cummings, the campaign director, dreamt up 
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the slogan and painted it on the back of the now infamous red campaign bus. 
Cummings was interviewed by the Commons Treasury Committee on 20 April 
2016 when Andrew Tyrie, the Conservative chair of the committee, ‘accused him 
near the start of the hearing of playing “fast and loose” with the facts. During the 
hearing Cummings accused the Bank of England and the Treasury of 
“scaremongering”, described Treasury civil servants as “charlatans” and accused 
the Cabinet Office of threatening people who did not support it on the EU. Tyrie 
said these were “truly extraordinary claims” and challenged him to provide 
evidence to back them up’ (quoted Sparrow, 2016). Perhaps the Remain 
campaign should have focused on the flipside of the control coin: (the apparent 
absence of) a derogation of responsibility. 
 However, the really interesting moment occurs after the referendum 
result persuaded Prime Minister Cameron to select a Clean Heels response and 
resign and left an open race for his position. As the Conservative MPs jostled for 
position it became clear that Johnson was the favourite. On 24 June most 
newspapers led with this assumption and noted his high level of support 
amongst the backbenchers. A week later, however, as the Telegraph described it: 
‘Boris Johnson was brought to his knees by the “cuckoo nest plot”' (1/7/16). The 
cuckoo nest plot turned out to be a result of a dinner party on 16 February 2016 
where Johnson was reluctantly persuaded, allegedly, by Gove (then the Secretary 
of State for Justice) to join the Brexit campaign. There, Gove’s wife, Sarah Vine (a 
journalist for the Daily Mail), suggested Johnson was very agitated – again 
hinting that Johnson was always more interested in securing the keys to number 
10 rather than an exit from Europe.  
Roll the clock forward and we are left with Johnson as front runner for the 
Prime Minister’s position, not in a stable environment but in a context where the 
Brexit decision has led to a financial scare on the markets and significant political 
disquiet both at home and in the rest of Europe; and all of this can be laid at the 
feet of the person likely to take over as Prime Minister and therefore to be 
responsible for sorting out the problems. On the morning that Johnson was 
allegedly about to announce his candidature for the position of Prime Minister, 
his campaign manager, Lynton Crosby, received a phone call from Gove, 
Johnson’s erstwhile ally, to suggest that Gove was going to stand against Johnson 
and would say that Johnson wasn’t fit to be Prime Minister. At this juncture 
Johnson allegedly changed his mind about his lifelong dream of being the British 
Prime Minister because (1) someone else would run against him and (2) that 
person might say something unpleasant about him.  
So, a man dedicated to the rough and tumble of politics, a man who 
political life has been littered with gaffes and crass put-downs of rivals – and 
who has been on the receiving end of mountains of abuse down the years – 
suddenly quits because someone said something uncomplimentary about him. 
Might not this be a good example of Clean Heels? Perhaps Johnson never really 
wanted to lead the exit campaign and never thought it would win; indeed he 
even began to write columns for the Telegraph that subsequently became known 
as Brexit-lite so radical were they in trying to reverse the consequences of Brexit. 
But, having assessed the uncertainty and potential crisis then facing the country, 
he desperately needed a face-saving scheme to allow him to walk away; enter 
Gove. What Gove’s ‘treachery’ did was allow Johnson to wash his hands of all 
responsibility for any potential problems that were likely as a consequence of 
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the vote. Of course, this was actually a difficult decision to make because Johnson 
has always sought high office and now he was walking away but, surely, if he left 
as a martyr to the cause he would be protected from any fall out and be in a 
position to return when the fall out had stopped? Michael Heseltine was never 
going to allow him to do that. As he said of Johnson, ‘He has ripped the Tory 
party apart, he has created the greatest constitutional crisis in peacetime in my 
life … He has knocked billions off the value of the savings of the British people…. 
a general who marches his army to the sound of the guns and the moment he 
sees the battleground he abandons it … The pain of it will be felt by all of us and, 
if it doesn’t get resolved shortly, by a generation to come yet.’ (quoted Guardian 
30/6/16). Or as Tim Farron, leader of the Liberal Democrats put it, Johnson was 
simply playing by the Bullingdon Club rules (a drinking club at Oxford University 
frequented by elite male students): you break something, then somebody else 
has to fix it. On the same day Johnson compounded his Clean Heels’ reputation by 
writing a column in the Telegraph headlined ‘Boris demands post-Brexit plan.’  
And then along came the new Prime Minister with an offer he couldn’t 
refuse – Foreign Secretary – a position that sent shock waves though the country 
and indeed the world. We will return to this when we look at Theresa May below. 
Tony Blair: Major Clean Heels/Minor Mea Culpa 
 
 
Tony Blair remains something of an enigma to many people outside the UK: how 
could a politician that achieved what no other Labour leader has ever done – 
three consecutive victorious general elections – who initiated Cool Britannia, and 
did so much to modernise the party and the country, end up as such a figure of 
public venom? The answer is simple: Iraq. Iraq was the anvil that not only 
destroyed that country, and triggered a series of events in the Middle East that 
are still playing out, but internally broke the promise of the centre-left and led to 
a general feeling of betrayal amongst many, though by no means all, Labour 
Party stalwarts. That complexity of response is also compounded by the dual 
thread of his defence: a Major Clean Heels response – I couldn’t have known 
what would happen and I’m not responsible for the subsequent anarchy – with a 
Minor Mea Culpa – sorry, mistakes were made (some even by me). 
On 15 February 2003 around 1 million people marched through London 
in a vain attempt to stop the slide to war that eventually killed around 251,000 
people (including 180,000 civilians and 179 UK service personnel)iii. Since the 
invasion in March 2003 Iraq, according to Jeremy Bowen (2016: 5), ‘has not had 
a single day of peace.’ 
Thirteen years later the 2.6 million word Chilcot Report (having been 
instigated by Gordon Brown, Blair’s successor as Prime Minister in 2009) 
provided a damning review of the war and Blair’s part in it. It had been, 
according to Blair, ‘the hardest, most momentous, most agonising decision I took 
in ten years as British Prime Minister.’ This sounds like a Dirty Hands response 
on first blush but that is quickly compounded by a subsequent claim that ‘I 
believe we made the right decision and the world is better and safer’ because 
although he acted in ‘good faith’ (note the irony here) the data about Saddam 
Hussein having weapons of mass destruction turned out to be false, but British 
soldiers did not die in vain. But, and here is the switch from Dirty Hands to Clean 
Heels, a private note from Blair to Bush on 28 July 2002, two months before the 
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now discredited dossier on weapons of mass destruction was published on 24 
September 2002 by the British Government, suggested to Bush that ‘I will be 
with you, whatever.’ As Chilcot concluded, ‘We have concluded that the UK chose 
to join the invasion of Iraq before the peaceful options for disarmament had been 
exhausted. Military action at that time was not a last resort.’ Besides this 
fabrication of the need to invade at this time, the report also concluded that, 
despite warnings – especially from Colin Powell who warned in September 2002 
of ‘a terrible bloodletting, after Saddam’ - that the preparation for the post-
conflict was woeful, and that Blair deliberately exaggerated the threat from 
Saddam Hussein. Indeed, in January 2003 (2 months before the invasion) Blair 
himself wrote to Bush saying that ‘the biggest risk we face is internecine fighting 
between all the rival groups, religions, tribes etc., in Iraq when the military strike 
destabilizes the regime’ (Quotes from Chilcot, 2016: 11). 
Added to this cacophony of failures Chilcot concluded that the British 
military were ill equipped for the war, and the UK did not achieve its own 
published objectives. As Chilcot concludes: ‘Mr Blair did not establish clear 
ministerial oversight of post-conflict strategy, planning and preparation.’ 
Moreover the Joint Intelligence Committee reports deny Blair’s claim that Isis 
was a product of Syria not Iraq, while Eliza Mannigham-Buller (then the Director 
of MI5) had said as early as 2003/4 that an invasion of Iraq was likely to increase 
the threat to the UK form terrorism 
It is also worth reiterating that Blair’s Christian faith also played a role in 
the justification of the war. As he said in 2006 ‘the decision to go to war in Iraq 
would ultimately be judged by God’ (quoted Wynne-Jones, J. (2009) Daily 
Telegraph May 23. This, one might assume, is another Dirty Hands response, but 
Blair also linked the defence of his actions to the ‘ongoing global struggle against 
Islamic terrorism’, though it would be difficult to accept that the fall of Saddam 
had no effect upon the rest of the region that has been engulfed in civil wars ever 
since. Here we can see a Clean Heels response being constructed that Blair 
locked into an argument that the post-war unravelling of order in Iraq could not 
have been known in advance. This Chilcot specifically denied, suggesting that the 
poverty of post-war planning made chaos more than likely and certainly not 
unforeseeable.  
In effect, the evidence accumulated and analysed by Chilcot does simply 
not support the major Clean Heels element of Blair’s defence, and the minor Mea 
Culpa aspect (‘I will take full responsibility for any mistakes without exception or 
excuse’) is inadequate in the face of the death and destruction directly and 
indirectly related to his decisions, especially given the eleven key moments that 
Chilcot identified in the two years prior to the invasion when cabinet colleagues 
should have been involved but were not. 
On 2 June 2003, two months after the invasion with Saddam in hiding and 
anarchy emerging, Blair visited Iraq and wrote to Bush: ‘The task is absolutely 
awesome, and I’m not sure we are geared for it. This is worse than rebuilding a 
country from scratch. We start from a really backward position. In time, it can be 
sorted. But time counts against us.’ But rather than accept an error had been 
made Blair went on the offensive because Iraq was ‘a test case for how 
determined we were to confront the threat. My worry now is that the world 
thinks: well, Iraq was a tough deal, so they won’t try that again. We have to be 
absolutely unapologetic.’ (Guardian, 7 July, 2016; my emphasis). Yet Blair had 
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already fretted – even before the invasion, ‘if it falls apart, everything falls apart 
in the region’ – so he knew what might happen. 
The UK military also had a hand in the debacle, particularly in what 
Chilcot noted was its inability to speak truth to power. This was compounded by 
the military ‘can do’ attitude that led to ‘wildly over-optimistic assessments of 
what was really happening on the ground’ (Quoted Guardian 10).  ‘At times in 
Iraq the bearers of bad tidings were not heard by military chiefs or ministers’ - a 
classic example of what Collinson (2012) calls ‘Prozac Leadership’ where blame 
culture proliferate and the senior leadership is either unwilling or unable to 
listen to the concerns from below. They were that military or political optimism 
was totally misplaced and the war could not be won. So if Tony Blair’s attempt at 
Clean Heels failed, where has it succeeded recently? Let us consider the case of 
Nigel Farage. 
 
 
 
 
 
Nigel Farage: Clean Heels personified 
 
 
Farage was hugely influential in securing the vote to leave the EU and then on 4 
July (ten days after the result of the referendum was announced) uttered the 
infamous line - ‘I said I wanted my country back…. Now I want my life back.’ iv 
Farage resigned (for the third time) from the leadership of UKIP (but not his 
MEP -Member of the European Parliament - role complete with £83,000 salary 
plus expenses). Farage first resigned from leadership of UKIP in 2009, to return 
after the 2010 General Election had revealed the limits of UKIP’s support, and 
then again in 2015 having failed to win the parliamentary seat of Thanet South 
for UKIP (though that resignation was limited to four days). 
On the morning after the referendum (24 June, 2016) Farage, managed a 
perfectly executed Clean Heels responses on British breakfast television 
(ITV/Good Morning Britain) by first rejecting the suggestion that the infamous 
bus advert - that £350million pounds a week sent to the EU would go back to the 
NHS - would actually be fulfilled and then denying any responsibility for it. There 
is some truth in this – he was indeed ostracised by the official Brexit campaign – 
but he never pointed out the fallacy of the claim and, having benefitted from the 
outright lie, promptly denied any responsibility for it. In fact an Ipsos MORI poll 
had noted that half the population believed the figure, even though the Institute 
for Fiscal Studies had concluded that the net effect of leaving the EU would be a 
deficit of £36bn (Stone, 2016). 
Farage was also involved in the controversial advert, ‘Breaking Point’, 
showing a long line of refugees waiting to enter the UK – although the photo was 
actually one of refugees entering Slovenia in 2015. Dave Prentis, leader of the 
UNISON trade union, condemned the UKIP poster as a “blatant attempt to incite 
racial hatred… This is scaremongering in its most extreme and vile form. Leave 
campaigners have descended into the gutter with their latest attempt to frighten 
working people into voting to leave the EU…. To pretend that migration to the 
UK is only about people who are not white is to peddle the racism that has no 
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place in a modern, caring society. That’s why UNISON has complained about this 
blatant attempt to incite racial hatred and breach UK race laws” (quoted Stewart 
and Mason, 2016). On 22 June, six days after Jo Cox (a Labour MP), was 
murdered by a man shouting ‘Britain First’ (the slogan associated with a far right 
political movement), Farage said on television that he apologized for the timing 
of the poster but not the content: ‘I can’t apologize for the truth’. Since it was not 
a queue of immigrants seeking entry to the UK it was not the truth, but those 
proficient in Clean Heels are seldom concerned with the truth. Nor did he seem 
concerned that the violent rhetoric of the campaign had done anything to 
encourage physical violence in the streets and he ‘derided the idea that he and 
his cohorts had gone too far with their infamous “Breaking Point” poster, and 
“the clear implication that, somehow, a bad atmosphere had been whipped up.’” 
(quoted in Bland, 2016).  
Farage’s appeal to the ‘truth’ as a legitimation for his words is actually a 
common feature of his political style. On 24 February 2010 he was censured by 
Buzek, the President of the European Parliament, for behaviour that was 
‘inappropriate, unparliamentary and insulting to the dignity of the House’ and 
docked ten days expenses. But his characteristic response was that ‘it wasn’t 
abusive, it was right’ (quoted Long, 2010). Clearly a Clean Heels strategy requires 
a safe and easy exit route and, as neither a member of the official Brexit 
campaign, nor a sitting MP in Parliament, his only responsibility was to UKIP – 
which he resigned from as leader, leaving UKIP to find a replacement and the UK 
to find a way out of the EU. This duty fell first to the new Prime Minister, Theresa 
May. 
 
 
Theresa May: Spectator to Dirty Hands 
 
 
Theresa May, the British Home Secretary between 2010 and 2016 (and one of 
the longest serving in that role) was appointed Prime Minister on 13 July 2016 
after her rivals for the position within the Conservative Party dropped out. She 
had played virtually no part in the Referendum Campaign but had voiced her 
intention to vote for the Remain campaign. In many ways this was a politically 
sophisticated Spectator role: taking a prominent position in either the exit or the 
remain campaign was risky, but a Remain-lite approach would, as it turned out, 
leave her with a clear run at the Prime Ministership. Not that May has a 
reputation for avoiding risk, and her relationships with the police have shown 
her to be very willing to take a Dirty Hands approach, particularly with the Police 
Federation (the main staff association). In 2014 she admonished the police: 
‘When you remember the list of recent revelations about police misconduct, it is 
not enough to mouth platitudes about "a few bad apples". The problem might lie 
with a minority of officers, but it is still a significant problem, and a problem that 
needs to be addressed.’ (Quoted in Robinson, 2014). 
But my real concern here is to consider her role as Prime Minister facing a 
thin Parliamentary majority, a country that had narrowly voted to exit the EU 
and a group of MPs that were politically divided and potentially rebellious. Her 
most intriguing decisions were to appoint three Brexit campaigners to the 
cabinet. Boris Johnson was appointed Foreign Secretary, David Davis was 
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appointed as the minister responsible for exiting the EU, and Andrea Leadsom 
was appointed as Minister for the Environment. Or as Freedland commented, 
‘Think of it as Brexit jobs for Brexit workers.’ v 
Johnson’s appointment was widely regarded as the highest risk. Sir Alan 
Duncan, appointed by May to be the Minister of State at the Foreign Office and 
thus Johnson’s deputy, had called his new (Italianate) boss ‘Silvio Borisconi’ the 
previous month and questioned whether Johnson had what it took to be Prime 
Minister (Hope, 2016). Tim Farron, the Liberal Democrat leader suggested, 
‘Presumably Boris Johnson's first act as Foreign Secretary will be to apologise to 
the President of the United States, and then the leaders of our European 
partners…. At this incredibly important time that will determine Britain’s 
economic and cultural relations with Europe, it is extraordinary that the new 
Prime Minister has chosen someone whose career is built on making jokes’ 
(Quoted by Mortimer, 2016). 
On 21 July a German reporter asked May ‘Why are you putting - to put it 
in football terms - a player on the pitch who doesn't actually want to play?’ 
quoted by Bulman, 2016). Given the context the reporter might have also asked 
why she had put someone who likened the EU project to Hitler’s campaign in 
charge but May fudged the response anyway and moved on. It is, however, a 
good question and actually embodies two questions: first, why did he accept and 
second, why did May appoint him? It may well be that - and having almost 
escaped with his Clean Heels strategy – Johnson realized that self-imposed exile 
was the equivalent of a living hell for someone as narcissistic as himself, and that 
the voters and his fellow MPs were wise to his manoeuvring and would still hold 
him responsible for a Brexit catastrophe. May’s motivation seems to have been a 
Pottery Barn label – you broke it – you own it. This has three elements: first, 
Johnson is a maverick and a populist maverick loose on the backbenches is 
infinitely more dangerous that one held tightly to your clutch: as Sun Tzu and 
Machiavelli allegedly said but never did: ‘keep your friends close but your 
enemies closer’. The second aspect is that if Brexit does lead to economic and 
political turmoil then Johnson – the chief architect of it all – will share at least 
some of the blame. Third, for May, this sharing aspect is the most dangerous 
because if it does go wrong then she will still attract the public’s ire for 
appointing him in the first place. It may well be that whatever happens May will 
ultimately take responsibility for any catastrophe and in that case she may have 
judged that it is surely better to have Johnson on side than sniping from the 
safety of the backbenches. 
May has replicated this approach with several other prominent 
Brexiteers, most notably Andrea Leadsom, and if the logic is sound for Johnson 
then it surely makes sense to do the same for Leadsom. In sum, the Prime 
Minister has shifted from her original position in the Referendum campaign as a 
Spectator to one that has positioned herself to cut off Johnson’s and Leadsom’s 
Clean Heels by taking up Dirty Hands. If it all goes wrong then the public and the 
press will surely push her to Mea Culpa but, if she is deft enough, she could just 
avoid this and keep her head. 
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Conclusion 
 
This article has concerned the antics and activities of four prominent British 
political leaders in 21 Days in 2016 that saw the UK vote to leave the EU, the 
Chilcot Report condemn Tony Blair for inadequate planning and poor strategic 
decision-making in the Iraq War, and Theresa May, only the second woman 
Prime Minister in the UK, appoint some leading Brexiteers to her first cabinet.  
A heuristic frame was constructed to help analyse the decisions that 
combined concern for the intent, the effect and the responsibility, and this 
suggested we could consider (at least) four different options: Dirty Hands, where 
the decision-maker accepts that the intent is purposive, that the effects may be 
deleterious and the responsibility is accepted; Clean Heels, when the decision-
maker intends the potentially disadvantageous consequences but refuses 
responsibility by exiting the scene; Mea Culpa, where the intent was not to cause 
problems but, now that they have become manifest, responsibility is accepted; 
and finally, the Spectator, where no intent, consequences or responsibility is 
taken nor intended: this barren land contains both armchair generals, ivory 
tower academics and those simply confused or ‘at sea’. 
These four approaches, naturally given the fluid nature of the boundaries 
in a heuristic, are sometimes merged or transited across by various actors and 
four illustrative examples are used to consider the utility of the model. Johnston 
tried to inhabit the Clean Heels box until ‘brought to heel’ by Theresa May’s 
cabinet appointment; Tony Blair combines a minor Mea Culpa (yes some aspects 
of the Iraq war were my fault) with a major Clean Heels (the effects that I was 
responsible for were beneficial and the problems were nothing to do with me); 
Nigel Farage, the archetypical Clean Heels (‘I’ve done my best/worst, now I’m 
out of here, good luck with all those foreigners’); and finally Theresa May, whose 
Spectator saw her through the Referendum with barely a scratch and then 
proceeded to do her best to make the Brexiteers sort the Brexit on the solid 
political lines that Machiavelli would no doubt have approved: ‘you broke it, you 
own it.’  
The heuristic may prove of value beyond the confines of the 21 days in 
British politics studied here. It would be interesting to consider whether the 
cultures of societies plays into this, so that, for example, authoritarian regimes 
are more likely to engage in Clean Heels when things go wrong than democracies 
or vice versa given the necessity of maintaining intermittent popular support in 
the latter. Or whether female leaders sit at a different position on the model than 
their male counterparts? It may also be of value to compare the fall out of the US 
Presidential election in November 2016 to that of Brexit in the UK. Finally we – 
academics – might reconsider whether being a professional Spectator (an 
irrelevant ‘expert’ in the words of Michael Gove {the former British Secretary of 
State for Education Minister}) has (mis)led us not just into an ivory tower but 
into a room full of mirrors. 
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